Under the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008), two Koreas continued improvement in relations begun by the previous Kim Dae-jung administration. The flow of matter-energy and information between two Koreas consistently expanded during these administrations. Comparing growth rates in information and matter-energy, we find that the growth rate in information ran faster than that in matter-energy from 1989 to 1994; since 1995, both have run at a similar rate. This shows that the two Koreas recognized the relative advantage of information in relation to matter-energy, but focused on the flow of matter-energy. The two Korean governments recognized the significance of the state of affairs in the region surrounding the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, external pressure had a significant influence on the two Koreas' relationship. Historically, the two Koreas' relationship has been dependent on external pressure from the big powers.
between parts, are the overall ones parts do not have. Emergent characteristics hidden in parts emerge in the process of the interaction in which parts are integrated into the context of the whole. It is possible to divide subsystems of the living system characterized by a complex system into the basic actors in South-North Korean relations. In addition, it is possible to find hidden patterns and to draw out the emergent information hidden in data by the flow of energy, information, etc., between subsystems on the contextual and procedural basis of interaction. Such active use of complexity science will enable policy decision-makers to analyze and view South-North Korean relations more scientifically in the long and short term and to select policies more easily. Moreover, it will prevent analysts from intervening in the analysis of South-North Korean relations by approaching such relations more scientifically. First, the predominant frameworks for data and analysis of South-North Korean relations show that there is no consistency in the construction of data and the categories of analysis and that data are built and analyzed mainly according to issue areas. In particular, the unification of categories is lacking in the South-North exchange and cooperation systems that focus on the data regarding human exchange and trade. The categories of South-North Korean relations data analysis remain at the level of analyzing the data on human and material exchanges and on issue areas such as politics, major personalities, diplomacy, administration, economy, science, and broadcasting. In particular, the interviews with the Ministry of Unification officials showed that such categories are treated as a major method for the analysis of South-North Korean relations. Such categories are effective for the linear and static data analysis of South-North Korean relations, but as relations develop in a more complicated manner, it is highly likely that analysis will be limited to the categories of the existing issue areas due to the data building method. This will make it impossible to accurately analyze the South-North Korean relations, which are getting more complex day after day, thus preventing policy makers from making the best policy selection. Such worry may be eased by the expansion of manpower for study and analysis, but the basic problems remain unsettled. Therefore, it is fundamentally necessary to address the basic problems in order to arrive at the best policies and to save the time and manpower required to build and analyze data and maintain the consistency of categories in building and analyzing the data of South-North Korean relations. The living system theory assumes that all cells, institutions, organisms, groups, organizations, societies, supranational systems, etc., have subsystems as the fundamental characteristics of life. Beginning with cells, the higher levels of the living system have emerged in the fray-out process. The eight-phase living system has evolved through the fray-out process over 3.8 billion years, with cells and the supranational system sharing the same basic system traits. Every living system has 20 important subsystems (Miller, 1995) and maintains its life, performing its functions and roles. In general, the higher level system is a suprasystem of the lower-level systems that have their own components and is composed of the subsystems, each of which performs one of the acts indispensable for all living systems. Composed of many components complicatedly related to each other, the higher-level systems have emergent structures and processes that are not seen in lower-level systems. This concept of emergent structures suggests that a system is not composed of components, but creates an autonomous order according to the interaction between components. Accordingly, there is a feedback process hidden between levels. Components are continuously revised, reassembled, and rearranged, as conditions change and actors learn, adapt, and evolve. The more components exist in a structure, the more opportunities are provided within the class level and the speed of evolution is increased. In particular, self-organizing is driven by the complementary action of counterbalancing and amplifying feedbacks. It is necessary to harmonize both with each other. Also, stability and instability and order and disorder are mixed with each other, thus enabling the presentation of images of macro-level types that are emergently caused by inartificiality. The complex system may cause emergent results not predicted at all; for example, if a small accident combines with the casual environment at the turning point. Like this, the living system characterized by the complex system maintains the state of energy thermodynamically through the continuous interaction with the environment within its own boundary. The input and output between matter-energy and information is indispensable for the living system. The metabolism of information is also indispensable for the survival of the living system. The input of information from the environment enables the living system to orient itself in time and space and adapt to the changing environment. In addition, such input enables an organism to find food and mates and to accept the feedback from the results of the living system. Furthermore, the information on the status of all the components of a system enables the system to adapt to internal stress. Eventually, information comes from the environment and every subsystem and is used for the guidance, control, and coordination of living systems. The living system, characterized by the complex system, requires matter-energy and information for survival. Consequently, to apply the living systems approach to South-North Korean relations, it is necessary to reconstruct the information and data regarding inter-Korean relations in 20 subsystem categories and to scientifically analyze the short and long term trends of matter-energy and information exchange between South and North Korea. In other words, it seems more scientific to analyze the major institutions and organizations in South and North Korea that correspond to 20 subsystems of the living system and to apply the results to the analysis of South-North Korean relations. In 1975, Kenneth N. Waltz in "Theory of International Relations" analyzed the "balance of power theory" as well as the "system theory" and criticized the reductive tendency in these theories. He believed that they were too simplistic yet deceptively complicated (Waltz, 1975) . And he contended that "for the study of international politics, reduction and the use of the analytic method won't do." Robert J. Lieber in his book published in 1973 also argued that "the system models are now to be regarded as only 'tools for investigating reality'" (Lieber, 1973) . On the other hand, James Grier Miller, a grand system theorist, being conscious of this kind of criticism, insisted that "Living Systems Theory is not reductionist" (Miller, 1995) . Miller's "Living Systems Theory" appears to be important enough to attract our critical attention in the sense that international politics resembles a living organism in its complexity. His theory, therefore, implies the possibility that the nature of the problems in the Far East Asian international political system can be explained in their full complexity. Miller's theory, however, is not really new. As a matter of fact, Joseph Frankel in 1979 proposed that one needs to take account of the extensity of the system and measure it by various indices of communication (Frankel, 1979) . In this paper, we regard trade between the two Koreas as a kind of inter-Korean matter-energy exchange for the analysis of the relations between the two Koreas. And because the North Korean system has the unique property of restricting human exchange between the inner and outer system and closing information flows, we may perceive more easily the flow of information exchange with South Korea. Thus, in this paper, the human exchange between the two Koreas is seen as a kind of information flow. In this paper, the historical development of the relations between the two Koreas is examined through the lens of the living systems or complex systems theory before inter-Korean matter-energy and information exchanges are analyzed. This historical review is intended to grasp the change in the relations between the two Koreas in the context of the North Korean nuclear testing.
II. SYSTEM DYNAMICS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KOREAS
South and North Korea in an analytical sense compose a set of 'loosely coupled systems' and are part of a subsystem of the higher-level 'international system (Northeast Asian system)'. Even small changes in the international system have had an enormous impact upon the South-North relationship. The systemic change in the international system developed into a fluctuation, followed by adaptive change (cooperative or non-cooperative) that took the form of either regime change in South-North Korea or full-blown integration of the Koreas. Accordingly, the necessity of each regime in South and North Korea and the change of international system created the relationship improvement between two Koreas (Sim, 2010) . Since the late 1960s, the two countries on the Korean Peninsula have periodically attempted to reduce conflicts and tension. In the Cold War period, the two Koreas confronted each other ideologically and militarily. From the time of national division in 1948 until the early 1970s, South and North Korea continued an intense confrontation against each other while denying the legitimacy of the other regime. But as the Cold War confrontation eased, the two Koreas started to improve their relationship. A new mood of peaceful coexistence started to develop in the international arena. This dialogue between the two Koreas originated from outside pressure rather than from the countries themselves. Inter-Korean relations were sometimes in a reconciliatory mood as dialogue was maintained, but, at other times, tensions increased after a provocation by North Korea (Sim, 2010) . In the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold War, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo began seeking diplomatic ties with China, the Soviet Union, and East European communist countries. Although these new bilateral relationships had the potential to isolate North Korea, Roh's "Nordpolitik" policy, initiated in 1988, included a thaw in relations with North Korea and promotion of inter-Korean economic relations. Reflecting a new mood of reconciliation and cooperation across the world, the Roh Tae-woo administration pushed for passage of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act on August 1, 1990, thereby opening a new era of exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas. During this period, a historic high-level inter-Korean meeting was held in Seoul on September 4, 1990. This dialogue yielded a set of historic agreements, including the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation (so called "the Basic Agreement") in 1991, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992, and the Agreement on Creation and Operation of Joint Commissions, which came into effect during the sixth round of high-level talks held in Pyongyang on February 19, 1992(Ministry of Unification, 2001). The two sides agreed to respect each other's political systems and to never use force or threaten military action. Also they agreed to promote inter-Korean cooperation, exchange, and travel. At the threshold confronted by catastrophe or improvement, the two Koreas made a breakthrough toward repairing relations by signing the Basic Agreement in 1991. At that time, the two Koreas had laid the basis for improving relations, but the Basic Agreement was not enforceable in domestic law. The improved relations between the two Koreas were the result of overwhelming outside pressure. From 1995 to 1999, dialogue and meetings between the two Koreas were not held on the Korean Peninsular but in countries outside Korea. Acts of provocation, such as the infiltration of a North Korean submarine into South Korea's East Sea on June 22, 1999, signified an escalation of the confrontation between the two Koreas. North Korea's problems, such as its worsening economic situation and food crisis, were driving the regime into a confrontational posture toward the South. If the two Koreas could not conduct exchanges with each other, the Koreas had to conduct exchanges with foreign countries for their survival. The Kim Dae-jung administration, which came to power in 1998, endeavored to promote a policy of reconciliation and cooperation toward North Korea. This "sunshine policy" was based on three principles: (1) no tolerance for armed provocation that would destroy peace on the Korean Peninsula, (2) elimination of the goal of achieving unification through a unilateral takeover or absorption, and (3) reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas aimed at ending the Cold War on the peninsula and converting inter-Korean relations from mutual distrust and confrontation to mutual reconciliation and cooperation. The Kim Dae-jung administration believed that South Korea should secure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and take a leading role in achieving coexistence and co-prosperity between the two Koreas(Sim, 2010).
Actively promoting the policy of reconciliation and cooperation toward North Korea, the heads of South and North Korea met for the first time in June 2000 and announced the June 15th South-North Joint Declaration to improve relations between the two Koreas. At that time, the South Korean government believed that economic cooperation would expedite the recovery of mutual trust as well as national homogeneity between South and North Korea. The two Koreas' relations substantially expanded following the Joint Declaration, and the sunshine policy of peace and prosperity continued under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. But the North Korean regime would not abandon nuclear weapon development, which put the brakes on further improvement in relations between the two Koreas. Even though South Korea successfully hosted the 2002 World Cup, the North Korean nuclear issue became a serious security issue in October 2002. Despite the North's actions, the Roh Moo-hyun administration continued to push ahead with the policy of peace and prosperity for the stability of the Korean Peninsular; the administration's goal was to manage both the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and improvement in relations between the two Koreas. In January 2003, a South Korean presidential special envoy visited North Korea, and in April 2003, three-way talks convened involving the United States, China, and North Korea, which began the multilateral process regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Based on this meeting, the first round of the Six-Party Talks-including North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan-was held in August 2003 in Beijing. Under the talks, North Korea was to abandon possession of nuclear weapons and its long-range missiles while the United States was to treat North Korea in a non-hostile and friendly manner. North Korean nuclear development raised tension on the Korean Peninsula. Even if North Korea emphasized the importance of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and peaceful resolution achieved through dialogue, North Korea many times had expressed that if the United States treated it in a hostile manner, the North had reason to possess nuclear weapons. If the United States were to establish diplomatic relations and become friendly towards North Korea, the North would be willing to abandon its long-range missiles. On the one hand, North Korea had engaged in efforts to improve relations with the South Korean government for outer matter-energy inflow needed to sustain its closed system; on the other hand, the North had secretly developed weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that could reach the United States, Japan, and South Korea because of its insecurity toward these countries and its concerns about national security, due to its inner distrust of openness and its systematic incompetence. South Korea had released the fact that a North Korean torpedo was discovered by the South in the West Sea near Mokpo City in 2003. A South Korean military officer said that the South Korean Navy stumbled across a North Korean torpedo floating down by the shore. The South Korean government did not stretch the meaning of discovering a North Korean torpedo with no evidence, even though it seemed that a North Korean submarine had violated the territorial waters of South Korea. For reconciliation and confidence building, South Korea would improve relations lest South Korea excite North Korea. In 2004, the system dynamics of the relations between the two Koreas were influenced by the practical benefit from economic cooperation and the security dilemma. Inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation in various fields 1 continued during this period. In 2004, 25 rounds of talks (over 61 days) were held, and 19 agreements were signed. In particular, as a result of inter-Korean General-level Military Talks and Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks, the two Koreas signed the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Naval Clashes in the West Sea and the Prohibition of Propaganda Activities in the Military Demarcation Line Areas. These agreements were intended to reduce military tension and build confidence, while maximizing each country's national interest. There were also dialogue and exchanges on economic cooperation 2 and humanitarian assistance 3 in that year, excluding the enlargement and exchange of media, personnel exchange availed the maintenance of the North Korean regime nothing. 4 However, the cooperation between the two countries was threatened by a number of incidents, including the cancellation of a condolence visit by a South Korean delegation to the North on the 10th anniversary of the death of Kim Il-sung, the U.S. House of Representatives passing the North Korean Human Rights Act, and a large group of North Korean defectors (468 people) escaping to South Korea. Even if occasions talks were cut short by political problems between the 2000 Joint Declaration and 2004, there was a momentum to maintain the relations between the two Koreas and the two Koreas pushed forward with economic cooperation as well as exchanges in the social and cultural area. These new system dynamics of matter-energy and information flow between the two Koreas diffused into subsystems. The two Koreas tried to expand from unilateral aid to reciprocal aid in their relations through the principle of comparative advantage. The two Koreas promoted the first-stage development of the one million 'pyeong' (3.3 million m²) of the Gaeseong 6 Industrial Complex (GIC) and actively cooperated in developing 10,000 'pyeong' (33,000 m²) of the complex as a pilot project. The two Koreas communicated with each other by telephone and produced goods for mutual profit through the GIC as evidence of the reciprocity in their relations and a symbol of peace and prosperity.
2 At that time there were 13 rounds of talks on economic cooperation. 3 Talks on the Yongcheon train explosion disaster relief, the 4th Inter-Korean Red Cross working-level contacts, etc. 4 There were talks on reunion visits of separated families on a regular basis, the need to expand confirmation of whereabouts and exchanges of letters by separated families as well as of those lost in war, settlement of North Korean refugees, etc. 5 Working-level talks on South-North joint march in the opening and closing processions at the 28th Olympic Games in Athens, etc. 6 The city is situated in North Korea.
III. THE RELATIONS AFTER NORTH KOREAN LAUNCHED A MISSILE AND THE FIRST NUCLEAR TEST
The two sides established the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Office to discuss inter-Korean economic cooperation on the GIC to provide greater convenience for joint ventures, including consulting services for private businesses. The two sides' civil servants started to work together to reduce tensions between the Koreas and promote joint economic cooperation. The declaration paved the way for institutionalizing inter-Korean relations. The two Koreas agreed to adhere to the basic spirit of the June 15, 2000, Joint Declaration and positively translate it into action. The Koreas had agreed to commit themselves to developing inter-Korean relations on the basis of mutual respect and trust, transcending differences in ideology and systems. They had also agreed not to intervene in each other's internal affairs. They agreed to work closely together to end their hostility of mutual relations, reduce tension and secure peace on the Korean Peninsula, resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiations, oppose war on the peninsula, and adhere strictly to their commitment to nonaggression. They recognized the need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime, and to work together with other countries directly involved in this matter to declare an end to the Korean War and implement the February 13 Agreement and the September 19 Joint Declaration, both regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The two Koreas agreed to expand and advance Inter-Korean economic cooperation, including creation of a special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea, and to promote mutual growth through inter-Korean economic cooperation. And they agreed to boost exchanges and cooperation in history, language, education, science and technology, culture and arts, and sports. 
IV. THE MATTER-ENERGY AND INFORMATION FLOW BETWEEN TWO KOREAS
The North Korean society has very little connection with the outer environment as the most closed system in the world(Sim, 2009). The North Korean system dissipated its energy and discharged its entropy, which originated from the closing of the North Korean society. In general, a system marked by openness and flexibility draws energy from its environment, often discharging entropy. But because the North Korean society is not an open system but a closed system, if the North Korean society does not produce necessary energy, it needs to absorb matter-energy and information from the outer environment for its survival. The North Korean society absorbed some matter-energy and information from South Korea through the relations improvement. The relations improvement of the two Koreas could be understood in the framework of co-evolution with their surrounding environment and the consistency and maintenance of their own regimes. As was stated above, it could be said that trade between the two Koreas is the exchange flow of the matter-energy they each needed, and that inter-Korean interchange of people is the main exchange flow of the information they each needed. Thus, the flow of the matter-energy and information between the two Koreas can be compared and analyzed. 2  2  1987  1  1  1988  8  8  1989  7  8  9  24  1990  15  2  7  24  1991  12  7  19  1992  80  8  88  1993  4  4  1994  10  10  1995  3  3  1997  7  4  11  1998  4  1  5  1999  8  8  2000  18  4  3  2  27  2001  2  2  3  1  8  2002  4  9  14  3  2  32  2003  5  6  17  7  1  36  2004  2  5  13  2  1  23  2005  10  3  11  4  6  34  2006  5  4  8  3  3  23  2007  13  11  22  3  6  55  2008 1 3 1 5 9  2001  2  2  2002  1  11  1  1  14  2003  3  14  2  1  20  2004  1  2  8  1  12  2005  2  6  2  2  12  2006  1  3  1  5  2007  5  4  16  2  1  28  2008  1  1  1  3  Total  33  10  61  16  10  6  136 The total number of inter-Korean agreements from 1971 to 2008 is 136. A full 58.9% of the total agreements between the two Koreas were reached under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. The recent situation on the Korean Peninsula, as Table 3 suggests, shows the consistent growth in the flow of matter-energy (based on the annual inter-Korean trade data) and information (based on the annual exchange of people), as Table 4 suggests. This strong growth could lower the level of entropy in North Korea, which gradually increases order and ultimately improves inter-Korean relations by promoting peace, reconciliation, and cooperation more than pushing for urgent political change. In the early years, inter-Korean trade mainly took the form of indirect trade through third countries. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the share of direct trade rose in areas of oriental medicine, agricultural products, and processed goods, as a result of direct agreements between the North and South Korean parties. Under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the sum of inter-Korean trade exceeded $1 billion for the first time. The emphasis of inter-Korean relations was on exchanges and cooperation in the economic and military spheres to build confidence and reduce tensions. In 2005, the number of visitors to North Korea, excluding tourists to Mt. Geumgang, was 87,028, the largest number in a single year since visits to North Korea were first approved in 1989. This is a 232% increase compared to the total of 26,213 visitors the previous year. The increase is mainly due to a sharp rise in visits for economic purposes, including the construction of the GIC. In 2005, the number of North Korean residents visiting South Korea was 1,313, a 309% increase compared to 321 visitors the previous year. The total number of inter-Korean visitors increased steadily. In the long-term view, the growth rate of matter-energy flow between South and North Korea seems to be consistent in the framework of consistent growth in quality. The relations between South and North Korea appear somewhat stable in matter-energy flow. But in the short-term view, the growth rate of matter-energy flow between South and North Korea seems to be recycling every three years. In the long-term view, the growth rate of information flow between South and North Korea seems to be consistent in the framework of consistent growth in quality. But in the short-term view, since 1989 the growth rate of information flow between South and North Korea seems to be recycling irregularly. In the long-term view, the growth rate of information flow between South and North Korea seems to be consistent until 1996 in the framework of consistent growth in quality. Since 1997 the growth rate of information flow between South and North Korea seems to be on an upsurge. Firstly, we can see the structural fluctuations in relations between South and North Korea in these figures. Especially, if we compare the growth rates for information and matter-energy, we find that the growth rate for information runs faster than that for matter-energy until 1991; then from 1991 to 1994 the growth rate for matter-energy runs faster than that for information. Also we can see that the growth rate for information is higher than that for matter-energy from 1995 to 2005. In their relations improvement, the two Koreas have recognized the relative advantage of information in relation to matter-energy. In spite of the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program, exchanges of people and merchandise between the two Koreas have been taking place routinely, almost on a daily basis. Inter-Korean travel routes are open on land and sea and in the air. Secondly, we can see in the figures that the structural change in relations between South and North Korea is somewhat linear. Thus, the political environment around the Korean Peninsula seems to be more stable than in the 1980s. The relations between South and North Korea would co-evolve with the environment. If we compare the growth rate in information and matter-energy, we find that the growth rate for information runs faster than that for matter-energy from 1989 to 1994; then since 1995 both run almost at the same rate. This fact shows that two Koreas recognized the relative advantage of information in relation to matter-energy but have focused on the flow of matter-energy.
Ⅴ. CONCLUSION
Kim Dae-jung administration's "sunshine policy" in South Korea promoted inter-Korean economic cooperation based on the "Principle of Separating Business from Politics" and improving inter-Korean relations. Also Roh Moo-hyun proclaimed that he would continue the policy of reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea in the interests of peace and prosperity. The two Koreas need to try to expand and facilitate the trust and cooperation through the interchange of information and matter-energy. But even with the growth of the exchange and cooperation between the two Koreas under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, there have been consistent obstacles to the development of the relations between the two Koreas, such as the North Korean nuclear issue and the insecurity of the North Korean political regime, as well as the surrounding situations on the Korean Peninsular. Traditionally, issues of interest to the big powers have a decisive effect on the relations between the two Koreas. Also, under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, North Korean nuclear proliferation, as a major issue, had a decisive effect on the two Koreas' relations. Therefore, the order imposed by the big powers continues to work in the relations between the two Koreas. The Roh Moo-hyun administration pushed ahead to try and settle the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue and make progress in the relationship between North and South Korea at the same time. But even with the South Korean government's strong efforts since the Kim Dae-jung administration, it is not easy to check the spread of nuclear weapons that North Korea has tried very hard to develop for national security. The two Koreas sought to improve the relations between the two Koreas within the existing political regimes. The South Korean political regime is entirely different from the North Korean one. The North Korean government has not changed under the Kim Jong-il regime, which is different from the periodical change of the South Korean government. Thus, the North Korea regime has dialogued with a changing partner because the South Korean government has changed periodically through elections. The dynamic of a system is the force that causes it to change. The unchangeable parts of the system cannot make the relations between the parts change dynamically. Rather, the system dynamic in the relations between the two Koreas is due not to the two Koreas but to the surrounding powers. The relations between the two Koreas have advanced in quality in that they seem to be reconciled with each other in the political and military sectors. The Koreas have exchanges in many spheres. We can see that in the vivid flow of matter-energy and information between the Koreas. But because North Korea did not renounce the development of nuclear weapons, we cannot say that there has been a fundamental change in the relations between the two Koreas.
South Korea wanted to continue the dialogue with North Korea to build confidence, reconciliation, and common prosperity under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. South Korea gave a great deal of matter-energy and information to North Korea. So, South Korea lessened the tension on the Korean Peninsular. North Korea received the immediate need of matter-energy and information for the system's survival from the South Korea; at the same time, it prepared for the long-term engagement with South Korea. North Korea has carried out unified tactics against South Korea. We can see North Korea's long-range missile launching, its torpedo discovered by the South in the West Sea, and its nuclear testing as proof that North Korea still has not given up the ambition of a forceful unification, even when the two sides have agreed to respect each other's political systems and to never use force or threaten military action. On the one hand, North Korea has engaged in efforts to improve relations with South Korea for outer matter-energy inflow need (such as its worsening economic situation and food crisis) to sustain its closed system; on the other hand, the North has secretly developed weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that could reach the United States, Japan, and South Korea, because of insecurity it feels toward these countries, due to the regime's inner distrust to openness and systematic incompetence.
